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Abstract	In	February	2015,	the	Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal,	a	court	that	investigates	and	rules	upon	complaints	of	unlawful	use	of	covert	techniques	by	public	authorities,	for	the	first	time	in	its	fifteen-year	history,	upheld	a	complaint	against	the	intelligence	and	security	services.	It	ruled	that	the	data	sharing	systems	between	the	US	and	UK	intelligence	services,	under	the	Prism	and	Upstream	programmes	revealed	by	Edward	Snowden,	had	been	unlawful	–	not	compliant	with	Articles	8	and	10	of	the	European	Convention	of	Human	Rights	–	from	their	inception	until	December	2014,	when	key	disclosures	about	their	practices	and	the	rules	that	governed	them	were	made.	The	Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal	ruled	that	after	that	date,	the	arrangements	were	now	compliant.	This	deceptively	simple	ruling	revealed	a	great	deal	about	the	processes	and	systems	that	govern	surveillance	in	the	UK,	about	the	strength	of	the	oversight	systems,	and	about	the	need	for	reform	of	both	the	law	and	the	enforcement	of	that	law.	Both	sides	in	the	case	can	take	comfort	from	aspects	of	the	ruling.	If	confirms	that	the	practices	of	the	intelligence	services	in	this	particular	area	are	deemed	to	be	lawful,	but	it	demonstrates	that	the	Snowden	revelations	were	valuable,	and	that	taking	cases	to	the	courts	can	force	the	authorities	to	be	more	transparent	about	how	they	operate.	The	ruling	should	be	seen	in	the	context	of	a	new	atmosphere	and	environment	surrounding	surveillance	law	in	the	UK.	A	series	of	reviews	are	taking	place,	a	number	of	cases	are	passing	through	the	courts,	and	they	seem	to	fit	within	a	bigger	pattern:	more	transparency	is	being	demanded,	more	accountability	is	being	required,	and	the	oversight	bodies	and	courts	can	no	longer	be	treated	as	‘rubber	stamp’	bodies	that	will	accept	without	question	whatever	they	are	told	by	the	authorities.				
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Article	Shockwaves	were	sent	through	the	privacy	and	surveillance	community	in	February	2015	by	a	one	page	ruling	of	the	Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal	–	the	court	that	in	its	own	words	‘investigates	and	determines	complaints	of	unlawful	use	of	covert	techniques	by	public	authorities	infringing	our	right	to	privacy	and	claims	against	intelligence	or	law	enforcement	agency	conduct	which	breaches	a	wider	range	of	human	rights.’1		The	ruling	appeared	simple	on	the	surface.	Firstly,	that	for	seven	years	the	UK	intelligence	and	security	services	had	been	acting	unlawfully	in	certain	aspects	of	their	surveillance	operations	in	coordination	with	the	US	–	the	Prism	system,	by	which	the	U.S.	accessed	the	servers	of	major	players	on	the	internet	such	as	Google	and	Facebook	,	and	the	Upstream	programme,	part	of	the	Tempora	programme	which	the	revelations	of	Edward	Snowden	suggest	involves	tapping	directly	into	the	fibre-optic	cables	that	form	part	of	the	internet	infrastructure	–	contravening	Articles	8	and/or	10	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights.	Secondly,	that	they	were	no	longer	acting	unlawfully,	as	a	result	of	certain	disclosures	about	those	operations.	In	essence,	the	ruling	was	that	what	the	intelligence	services	were	doing	in	relation	to	Prism	and	Upstream	was	fine,	but	they	hadn’t	been	telling	the	public	enough	about	it.	After	disclosing	more	about	what	they	were	doing	–	about	the	rules	that	govern	how	information	gathered	through	Prism	could	be	accessed	and	examined	–	that	made	their	activities	compliant.	In	other	words,	the	unlawfulness	of	the	surveillance	was	not	that	it	was	or	might	be	happening,	but	that	the	rules	about	how	it	operated	had	been	kept	secret.	That	secrecy	made	the	surveillance	unlawful.	This	in	itself	is	a	critical	point:	one	of	the	key	trends	in	surveillance	and	surveillance	law	is	the	movement	towards	a	requirement	for	more	transparency	and	accountability.	Keeping	arrangements	secret	conflicts	with	those	drives	for	both	transparency	and	accountability.	In	addition,	the	necessary	disclosure	only	happened	as	a	result	of	the	Claimants	taking	the	case	–	and	the	Claimants	only	knew	enough	to	be	able	to	take	the	case	as	a	result	of	the	revelations	of	Edward	Snowden.	Without	the	revelations,	and	without	the	case,	the	surveillance	activities	and	the	rules	that	govern	them	would	have	remained	secret.	This	may	be	the	most	important	aspect	of	the	whole	story.	
A	first	upheld	complaint	The	case	represented	the	first	time	in	the	relatively	short	history	of	the	Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal,	established	in	2000,	that	a	complaint	against	one	of	the	UK’s	intelligence	services	was	upheld.	It	was	not,	as	shall	be	discussed,	the	last	time,	a	reflection	of	the	disarray	that	the	laws	governing	surveillance	in	the	UK	have	found	themselves	in	since	the	revelations	of	Edward	Snowden.	Those	revelations	form	the	central	core	to	this	case.	Though	as	shall	be	shown	the	final	ruling	on	this	case	-	or	to	be	more	precise	these	cases	–	was	fairly	straightforward,	the	case	itself	was	far	from	it.	Indeed,	its																																																									1	http://www.ipt-uk.com		
complexity	can	be	seen	in	almost	every	element.	Five	principle	claimants	were	involved	–	Liberty	(The	National	Council	for	Civil	Liberties),	Privacy	International,	the	ACLU	(American	Civil	Liberties	Union),	Amnesty	International	and	Bytes	for	All	–	and	those	five	claimants	are	some	of	the	most	important	civil	liberties	NGOs	in	the	world.		The	respondents	include	GCHQ	(The	Government	Communications	Headquarters),	the	Security	Service	(more	commonly	referred	to	as	MI5)	and	the	Foreign	Secretary	(more	properly	the	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office):	in	effect,	it	was	the	entirety	of	the	United	Kingdom	security	and	intelligence	apparatus	that	was	being	challenged,	though	only	in	relation	to	some	very	specific	activities:	the	PRISM	and	Tempora	programmes	whose	possible	existence	was	revealed	by	Edward	Snowden.	Moreover,	the	court	involved	–	the	Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal	–	is	one	that	few	people	had	even	heard	of	before	the	ruling,	and	fewer	still	understood.	It	uses	somewhat	arcane	methods,	including	‘open’	and	‘closed’	hearings,	working	on	the	basis	of	assumptions	and	relying	on	‘facts’	that	are	neither	confirmed	nor	denied	by	the	authorities.	Even	the	rulings	on	the	case	are	not	simple.	There	was	an	initial	ruling	in	December	2014	(‘the	December	ruling’)	which	effectively	ruled	that	the	PRISM	was	compliant	but	left	questions	open,	questions	that	were	resolved	in	February	2015	with	two	linked	rulings:	a	one	page	summary	and	a	12	page	more	detailed	judgment	(‘the	February	ruling’).2	All	this	means	that	the	rulings	themselves,	and	their	significance	or	otherwise,	need	some	careful	unpicking.	As	well	as	this	unpicking,	the	rulings	need	to	be	seen	in	the	context,	of	a	time	when	the	whole	of	UK	surveillance	law	is	under	very	detailed	scrutiny	and	criticism.	There	have	been	three	reviews	in	the	last	year,	from	the	Intelligence	and	Security	Committee	of	Parliament3	(ISC),	the	Independent	Reviewer	of	Terrorism	Legislation4	(David	Anderson	QC)	and	from	the	Royal	United	Services	Institute	(RUSI)5	all	of	which	have	criticised	the	laws	to	some	extent.	The	most	recent	such	law,	the	Data	Retention	and	Investigatory	Powers	Act	has	been	overturned	by	a	ruling	in	the	High	Court	in	July	2015,	and	later	that	month	the	UN	criticised	the	UK’s	surveillance	laws	in	the	report	from	the	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights.6	Indeed,	as	shall	be	shown,	the	competence	and	appropriateness	of	the	Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal	itself	is	under	some	warranted	challenge:	whether	it	provides	the	necessary	scrutiny	and	accountability	for	those	responsible	for	surveillance	and	related	activities	remains	quite	rightly	under	question.	
The	Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal	
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The	Investigatory	Powers	Tribunal	(‘IPT’)	was	set	up	in	2000	under	the	Regulation	of	Investigatory	Powers	Act	2000	(‘RIPA’)	Section	65.7	As	the	IPT	website	describes	it:	“It	is	one	of	a	range	of	oversight	provisions	which	ensure	that	public	authorities	act	in	ways	that	are	compatible	with	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998,	the	legislation	which	translated	into	UK	law	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights.	Specifically,	it	provides	a	right	of	redress	for	anyone	who	believes	they	have	been	a	victim	of	unlawful	action	under	RIPA	or	wider	human	rights	infringements	in	breach	of	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998.”8	RIPA	itself	has	been	subject	of	much	criticism	since	it	was	first	enacted:	criticism	exacerbated	by	the	number	of	occasions	that	its	powers	have	seemingly	been	misused.	It	has	also	been	subject	to	much	amendment	and	is	viewed	by	many	as	cumbersome,	confusing	and	in	need	of	urgent	reform	or	replacement.	As	David	Anderson	QC	put	it	in	his	2015	review:	“RIPA,	obscure	since	its	inception,	has	been	patched	up	so	many	times	as	to	make	it	incomprehensible	to	all	but	a	tiny	band	of	initiates.	A	multitude	of	alternative	powers,	some	of	them	without	statutory	safeguards,	confuse	the	picture	further.	This	state	of	affairs	is	undemocratic,	unnecessary	and	–	in	the	long	run	–	intolerable.”9	The	role	of	the	IPT,	however,	is	to	implement	this	cumbersome	and	confusing	law	–	and	the	February	2015	ruling	was	an	example	of	just	that.	Specifically,	the	IPT	ruled	upon	the	compatibility	of	the	programmes	under	scrutiny	–	PRISM/Upstream	and	Tempora	–	with	Articles	8	and	10	of	the	ECHR.		As	noted,	RIPA	itself	is	complex	and	often	confusing	–	but	it	is	part	of	a	wider	and	perhaps	even	more	confusing	landscape	of	scrutiny	and	oversight	of	surveillance.	Indeed,	in	their	initial	ruling	in	December	2014	on	the	Liberty	and	others	case,	the	IPT	made	a	point	of	stating	that	it,	rather	than	two	of	the	other	possible	organs	of	oversight,	the	Intelligence	and	Security	Committee	of	Parliament	and	the	Interception	of	Communications	Commissioner,	was	the	appropriate	body	for	this	review.	“The	Tribunal	has	in	our	judgment	very	distinct	advantages	over	both	the	Commissioner	and	the	ISC,	some	of	which	are	set	out	in	paragraphs	70	to	76	of	the	Respondents’	Response.”10	These	‘distinct	advantages’	relate	directly	to	the	somewhat	unusual	way	in	which	the	IPT	operates:	its	combination	of	‘open’	and	‘closed’	hearings,	its	ability	to	hold	hearings	and	make	rulings	on	the	basis	of	‘assumed	facts’,	and	its	access,																																																									7	Regulation	of	Investigatory	Powers	Act	2000,	Section	65,	at	http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/65		8	From	the	IPT	website:	http://www.ipt-uk.com/section.aspx?pageid=1		9	“A	Question	of	Trust,	Report	of	the	Investigatory	Powers	Review,”	David	Anderson	QC,	p8,	para	35.	Online	at	https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report-Print-Version.pdf		10	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	46	
partly	as	a	result	of	the	former	two	advantages,	to	what	is	described	in	the	December	ruling	as	‘all	secret	information’.	
Open	and	closed	hearings	The	IPT	takes	apparent	pride	in	the	way	it	combines	‘open’	public	hearings,	which	are	reported	on	in	detail,	with	‘closed’	hearings	with	representatives	of	the	authorities,	the	details	of	which	remain	secret	and	unreported.	It	believes	this	gives	a	unique	perspective	and	advantage	when	dealing	with	surveillance.	This	is	from	the	December	ruling,	responding	to	criticism	from	the	claimants:	“We	do	not	accept	that	the	holding	of	a	closed	hearing,	as	we	have	carried	it	out,	is	unfair.	It	accords	with	the	statutory	procedure,	and	facilitates	the	process	referred	to	in	paragraphs	45	and	46	above.	This	enables	a	combination	of	open	and	closed	hearings	which	both	gives	the	fullest	and	most	transparent	opportunity	for	hearing	full	arguments	inter	partes	on	hypothetical	or	actual	facts,	with	as	much	as	possible	heard	in	public,	and	preserves	the	public	interest	and	national	security.”11	In	this	case,	there	was	a	five	day	public	hearing	followed	by	a	one	day	closed	hearing	to	consider	arrangements	described	as	‘below	the	waterline’	and	‘too	confidential	and	sensitive	for	discussion	in	open	court	in	the	interests	of	preserving	national	security”.12	The	claimants	were	not	represented	at	the	closed	hearing:	the	IPT	has	arrangements	where	it	is	possible	for	claimants	to	be	represented	by	a	‘Special	Advocate’	who	can	represent	their	interest	without	disclosing	any	confidential	information,	but	in	this	case	it	was	ruled	that	no	such	Special	Advocate	was	necessary.	The	advantages	of	such	a	system	are	clear	but	there	are	disadvantages	too,	and	the	level	of	trust	that	is	required	inevitably	draws	questions	and	in	a	climate	where	trust	is	at	a	premium	can	make	things	more	difficult	than	they	might	otherwise	be.	This	is	to	an	extent	exacerbated	by	the	UK	intelligence	services’	long	term	policy	to	‘neither	confirm	nor	deny’	either	the	existence	of	programmes	or	of	particular	details	relating	to	surveillance:	“…the	long-standing	policy	of	the	UK	Government	is	to	neither	confirm	nor	deny	the	truth	of	claims	about	the	operational	activities	of	the	Intelligence	Services,	including	their	intelligence-gathering	capabilities	and	techniques.”13	
Assumed	Facts	and	‘alleged	factual	premises’	This,	however,	is	ameliorated	to	an	extent	by	the	ability	of	the	court	to	work	on	the	basis	of	‘assumed	facts’	and	‘alleged	factual	premises’:	‘facts’	and	premises	agreed	upon	by	the	parties	for	the	purposes	of	the	ruling,	but	neither	confirmed	nor	denied	by	the	relevant	intelligence	services.	In	this	case,	the	key	‘alleged	factual	premises’	relate	to	the	Prism	system,	set	out	in	the	December	ruling.	
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“1.	The	US	Government’s	“Prism”	system	collects	foreign	intelligence	information	from	electronic	communication	service	providers	under	US	court	supervision.	The	US	Government’s	“upstream	collection”	programme	obtains	internet	communications	under	US	court	supervision	as	they	transit	the	internet.	2.	The	Claimants’	communications	and/or	communications	data	(i)	might	in	principle	have	been	obtained	by	the	US	Government	via	Prism	(and/or,	on	the	Claimants’	case,	pursuant	to	the	“upstream	collection”	programme)	and	(ii)	might	in	principle	have	thereafter	been	obtained	by	the	Intelligence	Services	from	the	US	Government.	Thereafter,	the	Claimants’	communications	and/or	communications	data	might	in	principle	have	been	retained,	used	or	disclosed	by	the	Intelligence	Services	(a)	pursuant	to	a	specific	request	from	the	intelligence	services	and/or	(b)	not	pursuant	to	a	specific	request	from	the	intelligence	services.”14	This	then	leads	to	the	IPT’s	formulation	of	the	issue	as:	“In	the	light	of	factual	premises	(1)	and	(2)	above,	does	the	statutory	regime	as	set	out	in	paragraphs	36-76	of	the	Respondents’	Open	Response	to	the	Claims	brought	by	Liberty	and	Privacy	satisfy	the	Art.	8(2)	“in	accordance	with	the	law”	requirement?”15	To	be	clear,	though	the	U.S.	government	has	acknowledged	the	existence	of	the	Prism	system	and	Upstream	programme16	the	U.K.	authorities	make	no	such	acknowledgment	in	respect	of	their	gathering	or	using	of	data	from	those	programmes.	This	is	particularly	stark	with	Upstream,	which	“…has	been	described	as	the	“alleged	Tempora	interception	operation”,	although	there	has	been	no	admission	or	explanation	as	to	what	this	alleged	Tempora	programme	consists	of…”17	Conversely,	the	claimants	are	not	required	to	prove	that	any	of	the	assumed	activities	have	actually	taken	place,	nor	that	they,	individually,	have	been	victims	or	suffered	harm	as	a	result	of	the	assumed	activities.	The	rulings	are	in	this	sense	hypothetical:	it	is	not	accepted	or	required	that	any	communications	actually	have	been	obtained,	retained,	used	or	disclosed,	just	that	in	principle	they	might	have	been.	The	rulings	are	nonetheless	significant.	The	‘electronic	communication	service	providers’	referred	include	some	of	the	giants	of	the	internet	world:	Microsoft,	Yahoo!,	Google,	Facebook	and	Apple	amongst	others:	the	scope	of	the	Prism	system	is	thus	immense.	Essentially,	the	claimants	were	asking	whether	the	way	in	which	the	UK	accesses	data	gathered	by	the	U.S.	from	electronic	communications	satisfies	human	rights	requirements	–	and	it	is	not	just	Article	8,	the	right	to	a	private	life,	but	Article	10,	the	right	to	freedom	of	expression,	that	was	being	tested:	the	IPT	rulings	cover	both.	
Oversight,	signposting	and	foreseeability																																																									14	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	14	15	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	14	16	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	48	17	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	5	
The	central	question	is	therefore	how,	given	that	a	significant	amount	of	information	about	both	the	systems	and	how	they	are	used	in	practice	must	remain	secret,	surveillance	can	be	deemed	to	be	in	compliance	with	human	rights.	The	resolution	to	that	question,	as	set	out	in	the	IPT	rulings,	relies	on	a	number	of	factors.	Appropriate	oversight	is	one	–	and	the	authorities	‘rely	upon	significant	oversight	of	the	Intelligence	Services	as	protection	against	arbitrary	interference	or	unlawful	use	of	powers	by	them’.18	They	set	out	how	that	oversight	provides	assurance	–	discussing	the	role	played	by	the	ISC,	described	by	the	IPT	as	‘robustly	independent’,19	and	the	Interception	of	Communications	Commissioner20	in	particular.		Beyond	that	oversight,	the	IPT	looks	for	‘signalling’	and	‘foreseeability’.	That	is,	that	sufficient	information	about	the	activities	of	the	intelligence	services	is	made	public	that	people	are	pointed	in	the	right	direction	to	know	the	kinds	of	activities	that	are	undertaken,	and	can	foresee,	in	general,	that	surveillance	might	be	happening	and	be	considered	lawful.	The	IPT	sees	it	as	their	role	to	assess	this	–	their	access	to	secret	information	and	their	ability	to	hold	closed	hearings	allows	them	to	do	so	appropriately.	“We	have	no	doubt	that	we	are	entitled	to	look	at	the	rules,	requirements	and	arrangements,	both	those	expressly	set	out	in	statute	or	in	the	Code	and	those	set	out	in	more	detail	in	arrangements	below	the	waterline,	but	which	are	sufficiently	signalled	in	publicly	available	documents	to	ensure	both	that	any	abuse	is	avoided	and	a	sufficient	degree	of	accessibility	and	foreseeability	is	secured.”21	This,	then,	is	the	essence	of	what	is	argued	in	the	cases.	It	is	not	just	a	question	of	the	activities	themselves,	but	whether	the	intelligence	services	provide	enough	information	to	the	public	for	the	public	to	have	what	amounts	to	an	overall	understanding	of	their	activities.	This	hits	at	the	heart	of	the	revelations	of	Edwards	Snowden,	of	which	Prism	was	a	critical	part:	the	degree	and	nature	of	the	surveillance	revealed	seemed	to	many	to	come	as	a	surprise	to	both	public	and	politicians.	In	the	terms	used	here,	the	case	of	the	claimants	was	that	programmes	like	Prism	had	not	been	sufficiently	signalled,	and	were	not	foreseeable.	
New	and	old	communications,	new	and	old	surveillance	That	being	so,	the	claimants	sought	declarations	from	the	respondents	that	the	‘the	soliciting,	receiving,	storing	and	transmitting	by	UK	authorities	of	private	communications	of	individuals	located	in	the	UK	which	have	been	obtained	by	US	authorities’	was	unlawful,	and	an	order	that	such	‘soliciting,	receiving,	storing	and	transmitting’	would	be	halted	until	a	legal	regime	compliant	with	ECHR	articles	8	and	10	was	in	place.	They	also	sought	to	have	any	unlawfully	obtained	material	destroyed.22	
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This	points	to	one	of	the	key	issues	of	the	case	–	the	different	rules	that	apply,	and	that	should	apply,	to	gathering	data	on	people	within	the	UK	and	people	
outside	the	UK.	This	is	just	one	of	many	examples	of	where	it	appears	that	technology	has	overtaken	the	law	–	and	perhaps	also	overtaken	the	practices	of	the	authorities.	Separation	of	‘internal’	and	‘external’	communications,	which	are	governed	by	different	rules,	is	no	longer	simple.	A	message	between	two	people	within	the	UK	might	be	routed	through	the	US,	or	might	be	handled	by	a	US	service	provider	such	as	Facebook,	and	stored	on	servers	owned	by	that	US	company	but	physically	located	in	yet	another.	The	claimants	suggested	that:	“…there	has	been	a	sea-change	in	technology	since	2000	which	means	that,	by	virtue	of	the	blurring	of	the	distinction	between	external	and	internal	communications,	s.8(4)	[of	RIPA]	is	no	longer,	as	the	ugly	phrase	has	it,	based	upon	a	misquotation	of	the	Sale	of	Goods	Act,	‘fit	for	purpose’.”23	The	claimants	argued	that	the	‘old’	law,	based	on	‘old’	technology,	was	no	longer	appropriate	and	hence	surveillance	cannot	use	it	as	a	basis	to	be	‘in	accordance	with	the	law’	(as	set	out	in	ECHR	Article	8(2)).	The	IPT	disagreed.	In	effect,	they	gave	the	benefit	of	the	doubt	to	the	security	services,	and	allowed	them	leeway	to	pursue	their	ends	flexibly,	and	without	imposing	restrictions	that	are	too	strong.	This	is	one	example:	“To	impose	an	obligation	upon	the	Respondents	not	to	read	the	communication	if	the	presence	of	the	individual	in	the	UK	is	simply	
suspected	would	impose	far	too	high	an	obligation,	particularly	in	the	course	of	extended	examination	of	substantial	numbers	of	communications.”24	This	was	just	part	of	a	larger	argument	–	but	the	principle	was	clear.	Further	sticking	points	concerned	the	nature	of	the	data	gathered	(including	the	blurring	of	meta-data	and	content),	the	degree	to	which	such	gathering	was	intrusive,	and	whether	the	intrusion	happened	when	the	data	was	gathered,	processed,	or	examined	by	humans	rather	than	algorithms.	All	these	issues,	from	the	perspective	of	the	claimants,	relate	to	the	changes	that	have	happened	in	both	the	technology	of	communications	and	how	that	technology	is	used.	Here	too,	the	IPT	appeared	unwilling	to	accept	that	the	game	had	changed.	They	stuck	steadfastly	to	what	might	be	viewed	as	a	traditional	approach	to	communications,	agreeing	with	the	respondents’	barrister	Mr	James	Eadie	QC	that	there	was	a	strict	separation	between	content	and	meta-data,	the	latter	less	important	and	less	intrusive.	“…notwithstanding	the	evidence	of	Mr	King25	and	Mr	Brown,26	interference	with	communications	data	is	plainly	less	intrusive	than	access	to	the	contents	of	the	communications,	and	less	informative.”27	
																																																								23	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	94	24	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	105	25	Eric	King,	of	Privacy	International	26	Professor	Ian	Brown,	of	the	Oxford	Internet	Institute	27	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	111	
Mr	Eadie’s	repeated	use	of	the	word	‘plainly’	in	his	submission,	quoted	in	the	December	ruling	a	number	of	times,	could	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	argue	that	things	should	not	be	looked	into	any	more	deeply	than	they	need	to	be.	The	‘plain’,	surface-level	interpretation	is	enough.	Though	the	IPT	did	not	appear	to	accept	everything	argued	by	Mr	Eadie	their	conclusion	was	similar	to	his:	that	communications	data	needed	less	protection	than	content.		The	IPT	dismissed	further	arguments	related	to	metadata	in	a	similar	fashion.	The	suggestion	that	metadata	should	be	protected	but	an	exception	granted	to	allow	its	to	determine	whether	someone	is	in	the	UK	or	not,	was	regarded	as	an	‘impossibly	complicated	or	convoluted	course,’28	while	concerns	that	metadata	could	be	gathered	to	create	a	‘just	in	case’	database	–	the	use	of	which	would	not	just	be	for	the	statutory	purposes	for	which	the	data	was	originally	intercepted	–	were	dismissed	in	part	as	a	result	of	what	was	disclosed	to	the	IPT	in	closed	hearings.29	On	perhaps	the	most	important	question	of	all	–	whether	‘surveillance’	occurs	when	data	is	gathered,	when	algorithmically	trawled,	or	when	accessed	and	examined	by	humans	–	the	IPT	effectively	also	accepted	the	views	of	the	authorities,	concerned	primarily	with	the	trawling	of	information	rather	than	the	gathering	of	that	information.		“The	indiscriminate	trawling	for	information	by	interception,	whether	mass	or	bulk	or	otherwise,	would	be	unlawful,	as	would	be	the	seeking,	obtaining	or	retention	of	material	which	is	unnecessary	or	disproportionate…	…even	if…	…large	quantities	are	lawfully	intercepted,	material	can	only	be	then	accessed	lawfully	if	it	is	necessary	in	the	interests	of	national	security,	for	the	purpose	of	preventing	or	detecting	serious	crime	or	for	the	purpose	of	safeguarding	the	economic	well	being	of	the	United	Kingdom	(“the	statutory	purposes”);	and	it	is	only	proportionate	if	it	is	proportionate	to	what	is	sought	to	be	achieved	by	lawful	conduct.”	30	The	IPT	accepted,	implicitly	at	times,	explicitly	at	others,	the	views	of	the	intelligence	and	security	services	over	the	nature	of	the	surveillance	–	and	largely	dismissed	the	arguments	made	about	the	change	in	the	nature	of	both	the	communications	and	the	use	of	those	communications	and	thus	of	the	surveillance.	It	was	hard	not	to	wonder,	in	the	December	ruling	in	particular,	whether	that	was	at	least	in	part	due	to	their	understandable	need	to	apply	rules	and	laws	that	did	not	fit	the	new	situation,	or	indeed	to	appreciate	the	full	implications	of	the	new	forms	of	communication	and	the	new	forms	of	surveillance	that	have	developed	around	them.	
The	February	ruling	At	least	some	of	this	changed	in	the	February	ruling	–	a	ruling	viewed	very	differently	by	GCHQ	and	the	Claimants.	The	primary	question	to	be	asked	was	about	the	‘signposting’	prior	to	the	December	ruling.	The	IPT	had	ruled	in	December,	subject	to	one	small	exception	discussed	below,	that	the																																																									28	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	113	29	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	138	30	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	160	
arrangements	for	surveillance	were	appropriate	and	lawful.	They	had	not,	however,	considered	fully	whether	it	was	lawful	only	because	of	the	disclosures	made	by	the	Intelligence	and	Security	Services	to	the	IPT	in	the	course	of	the	case.	Signposting	was	crucial.	As	the	IPT	had	put	it	in	the	December	ruling,	it	is	necessary	that:	“Appropriate	rules	or	arrangements	exist	and	are	publicly	known	and	
confirmed	to	exist,	with	their	content	sufficiently	signposted,	such	as	to	give	an	adequate	indication	of	it.”31	[emphasis	added]	   The	Claimants	submitted	that	without	the	extra	information	provided	in	December,	these	arrangements	were	not	publicly	known	or	confirmed	to	exist.	“It	is	only	by	reference	to	the	Disclosures	that	[we	were]	satisfied	that	there	was	a	sufficiently	accessible	indication	to	the	public	of	the	legal	framework	and	any	safeguards.	In	the	absence	of	the	Disclosures	any	such	indications	would	have	been	insufficient	and	the	intelligence	sharing	regime	would	not	have	been	in	‘accordance	with	the	law/prescribed	by	law’.”32	The	IPT	agreed	with	this	–	this	is	the	essential	reason	for	the	ruling	in	the	Claimants’	favour	insofar	as	arrangements	before	the	December	ruling	took	place.	The	December	ruling	had	also	left	open	a	particular	question	concerning	arrangements	for	requests	made	to	a	foreign	government	for	information	in	the	absence	of	a	specific	RIPA	interception	warrant	issued	by	the	secretary	of	state	–	a	specific	kind	of	event	that	it	was	stated	had	never	actually	occurred.	The	IPT	asked	for	further	information	to	be	disclosed,	and	with	that	further	disclosure,	which	indicated	that	the	Secretary	of	State	would	have	to	personally	consider	and	approve	examination	should	that	occasion	arise,	the	IPT	was	satisfied.	The	two	sides	viewed	the	February	ruling	very	differently.	GCHQ	viewed	it	as	a	small	technical	matter,	resolved	by	small	additional	disclosures,	and	saw	the	ruling	as	essentially	confirming	that	their	surveillance	was	lawful	and	proportionate.	The	Claimants,	and	in	particular	Liberty	and	Privacy	International,	saw	it	as	a	vindication	of	their	actions	and	an	indictment	of	the	surveillance	system.	Both	sides	have	reasons	for	their	views.	GCHQ	are	correct	that	the	IPT	ruled	that	the	current	situation	is	lawful,	and	they	did	so	without	GCHQ	having	to	alter	its	practices	or	arrangements	at	all.	Liberty	and	Privacy	International	are	right	to	feel	vindicated	in	a	number	of	ways.	Firstly,	the	fact	that	it	was	the	first	time	that	the	IPT	had	ever	upheld	a	complaint	against	the	intelligence	services	should	not	be	dismissed.	The	IPT	can	no	longer	be	seen	in	any	real	way	as	a	‘rubber	stamp’	body	that	simply	validates	whatever	the	intelligence	and	security	services	say.	Secondly,	the	fact	that	the	case	happened	at	all	was	dependent	on	the	programmes	revealed	by	Edward	Snowden	–	and	showed	that	those	revelations	mattered.	The	extra	disclosures																																																									31	The	December	ruling,	paragraph	41,	cited	in	the	February	ruling,	paragraph	16	32	The	February	ruling,	paragraph	19,	citing	the	submission	by	Matthew	Ryder	QC,	representing	Liberty	and	others.	
that	made	the	surveillance	(in	the	IPT’s	view)	lawful	were	only	made	as	a	result	of	this	case:	the	additional	transparency	was	effectively	forced	out	of	GCHQ.	Thirdly,	details	in	the	February	ruling	are	notably	less	favourable	to	the	respondents:	the	IPT	agreed	with	Privacy’s	submissions,	for	example,	that	a	number	of	claims	made	by	the	respondents	were	false.33	
The	bigger	picture	Fouthly,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	the	February	ruling	should	be	seen	as	part	of	a	much	bigger	trend	in	surveillance	law	–	a	trend	that	requires	more	transparency,	more	clarity,	more	emphasis	on	compliance	with	human	rights,	and	an	understanding	of	the	implications	of	the	new	forms	of	communication	and	of	surveillance.	The	invalidation	of	the	Data	Retention	Directive	in	the	Digital	Rights	Ireland	case34	and	the	subsequent	overturning	of	the	UK’s	Data	Retention	and	Investigatory	Powers	Act,35	a	law	passed	at	breakneck	pace	to	attempt	to	cover	for	the	invalidity	of	the	Data	Retention	Directive	are	two	direct	legal	examples	of	this	trend,	but	all	three	of	the	recent	UK	reports	–	from	the	ISC,	the	Independent	Reviewer	of	Terrorism	Legislation	and	the	Royal	United	Services	Institute	–	point	in	the	same	direction.	The	law	in	the	UK	is	out-dated,	insufficient	and	hard	to	understand.	The	complexity	and	obscurity	of	the	rulings	by	the	IPT	in	these	cases	is	in	part	a	result	of	the	complexity	and	obscurity	of	the	law	that	the	IPT	is	attempting	to	apply.	Events	subsequent	to	the	rulings	have	if	anything	added	to	the	problem.	The	most	recent	rulings	of	the	IPT,	dealing	with	yet	another	aspect	of	the	cases	ruled	upon	in	December	and	February	–	the	specific	questions	concerning	the	interception	of	communications	of	a	series	of	NGOs,	from	Liberty	and	Privacy	International	to	the	Egyptian	Initiative	for	Personal	Rights	–	caused	even	more	concern.	First	of	all,	rulings	were	made	in	favour	of	two	of	the	claimants	–	specifically	that	their	communications,	though	lawfully	intercepted,	were	held	for	longer	than	they	should	have	been.	Secondly,	and	most	embarrassingly,	nine	days	after	the	rulings	the	IPT	admitted	that	they	had	made	an	error	about	which	of	the	claimants’	communications	had	been	held	for	two	long.	They	had	ruled	in	favour	of	The	Egyptian	Initiative	for	Personal	Rights,	but	should	have	ruled	in	favour	of	Amnesty	International.	The	error	had	been	revealed	by	the	respondents,	rather	than	noticed	by	the	IPT,	which	itself	raises	questions	about	the	ability	of	the	IPT	to	play	the	role	that	it	does	in	relation	to	the	authorities.	The	Egyptian	Initiative	for	Personal	Rights	and	Amnesty	International	are	very	different	entities	in	many	ways	–	and	very	different	assessments	of	appropriateness	and	proportionality	would	apply	to	each	of	them.	There	is	another	case	at	the	IPT	already	underway	–	a	challenge	over	whether	communications	between	MPs	and	citizens,	protected	under	the	
																																																								33	For	example	in	the	February	ruling,	paragraphs	20	and	21	34	Joined	Cases	C‑293/12	and	C‑594/12	35	In	David	Davis	and	others	-v-	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	[2015]	EWHC	2092	(Admin)	
‘Wilson	Doctrine’	were	being	unlawfully	intercepted.36	Further	cases	can	be	expected.	The	ultimate	consequence	of	this,	and	of	the	rulings	in	both	December	and	February,	is	that	surveillance	law	in	the	UK	remains	very	much	in	flux.	There	is	a	further	surveillance	law	in	the	pipeline:	an	Investigatory	Powers	Bill	was	mentioned	in	the	Queen’s	Speech	after	the	May	2015	General	Election.	Details	have	yet	to	appear,	though	there	have	been	many	rumours	about	what	it	will	contain.	When	it	does	finally	appear,	it	will	need	to	be	subjected	to	great	scrutiny.	
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